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Walls or Welcome Mats? Immigration and the Labor Market
Summary
While the public debate on immigration reform has been divisive, the tools of economics provide clear lessons
for a way forward. The single most important lesson that economics holds for immigration policymakers is
that immigration restrictions are costly, because they interfere with the free movement of labor. Most
economists believe that the gains to global GDP from greater labor mobility are very large. Beyond the
estimated gains to the world economy, the consensus among economists is that, as a whole, U.S. natives gain
from immigration in the labor market. While immigration may have an adverse effect on some native wages
and employment—particularly for the least skilled workers—the empirical evidence indicates these effects, if
existent, are small.
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Walls or Welcome Mats? 
Immigration and the Labor Market 
(Part one of a two-part series)
Howard F. Chang
In April of 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of United 
States vs. Texas, as 26 states challenge President Obama’s executive actions on 
immigration.
President Obama has sought to protect roughly five 
million immigrants from deportation through his 
administration’s Deferred Action for Parents of Ameri-
cans (DAPA) and Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) programs. Texas and the other states 
claim that these orders impose significant education, 
health care, and law enforcement costs on the states.1 
An amicus brief filed by professional economists and 
other scholars, however, responds that DAPA and 
DACA, by granting many of these immigrants autho-
rization to work, will expand economic output and 
increase tax revenues. The debate over the impact of 
immigrants in this case reflects the broader debate over 
immigration reform, which also turns on competing 
claims regarding the economic effects of immigration.
In particular, the most salient economic issues in 
debates over immigration restrictions and immigration 
reform revolve around the effects that immigrants have 
as workers in the labor market and the impact they 
have on the public treasury. I will address each contro-
versy in its own Issue Brief.2 In this brief (Part I), I will 
analyze the effects of immigration in the labor market. 
In Part II, which will be issued in late May 2016, I 
will turn to the impact of immigration on the public 
SUMMARY
• While the public debate on immigration reform has been divisive, 
the tools of economics provide clear lessons for a way forward.
• The single most important lesson that economics holds for 
immigration policymakers is that immigration restrictions are 
costly, because they interfere with the free movement of labor. 
Most economists believe that the gains to global GDP from 
greater labor mobility are very large.
• Beyond the estimated gains to the world economy, the consensus 
among economists is that, as a whole, U.S. natives gain from 
immigration in the labor market. While immigration may have an 
adverse effect on some native wages and employment—par-
ticularly for the least skilled workers—the empirical evidence 
indicates these effects, if existent, are small.
• To the extent that immigration has any adverse effects on the 
distribution of income among natives, the best response would 
be redistribution through progressive tax reforms rather than 
through restrictive immigration policies.
• Restrictive immigration policies not only diminish the general 
economic gains from having immigrants in the labor market, but 
they specifically impose burdens on households with working 
women by driving up the cost of services demanded dispro-
portionately by these households, including child care, food 
preparation, and housekeeping.
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treasury in the United States.
The tools of economics prove 
useful in analyzing and evaluating 
immigration laws and generate some 
striking normative implications for 
immigration reform. Indeed, there 
is broad agreement among most 
immigration scholars about the path 
forward for immigration law in the 
United States. Although there is 
still debate among economists about 
exactly how much immigrants affect 
the wages and employment of the 
least skilled native workers, empiri-
cal evidence has led most scholars 
to conclude that any adverse effects 
are small, if these effects are nega-
tive at all. There also remains some 
disagreement over the degree to which 
immigrants and natives are substitutes 
in the labor market (the evidence  
suggests that they are imperfect 
substitutes), and this debate has 
important implications for assessing 
the impact immigration has on native 
workers. Most economists favor liber-
alized immigration policies, however, 
and the research that supports their 
conclusions warrants the attention  
of policymakers.
THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF 
LABOR MIGRATION
The single most important lesson that 
economics holds for immigration pol-
icymakers is that immigration restric-
tions are costly because they interfere 
with the free movement of labor. 
Workers tend to move to a country of 
immigration if they can earn higher 
wages there. All else being equal, the 
movement of labor from an economy 
in which workers produce less value 
to an economy in which they produce 
more value leads to a more efficient 
allocation of labor across countries 
and yields net gains for the world as  
a whole.
How much does the world stand 
to gain from increased liberaliza-
tion? Most economists believe that 
the gains from greater labor mobility 
are very large. Economists who have 
estimated the gains from the elimina-
tion of migration barriers conclude 
that “even the smallest (most cautious) 
estimations exceed the combined cur-
rent levels of development assistance 
and foreign direct investment to the 
developing world.”3 In fact, even par-
tial liberalization of restrictions would 
produce significant gains. Because the 
first units of labor to move enjoy the 
greatest increase in wages, these yield 
the greatest increase in worldwide 
production. In fact, one economist 
who has surveyed the estimates of 
many other economists infers that 
“the emigration of less than 5 percent 
of the population of poor regions 
would bring global gains exceeding 
the gains from total elimination of all 
policy barriers to merchandise trade 
and all barriers to capital flows.”4 
Table 1 surveys some estimates from 
the economic literature of the gains to 
global output from the elimination of 
migration restrictions.
The magnitude of these estimates 
of the potential impact of immigra-
tion liberalization on global income 
is shocking. Furthermore, it is quite 
possible that the smaller estimates 
offered by these economists are based 
on extreme and unduly conservative 
assumptions: estimates vary widely 
in part because they reflect different 
assumptions regarding the degree to 
which immigrant workers may be less 
productive than native workers in the 
country of immigration. 
Some critics of these studies 
object that migration entails mov-
ing costs and that these estimates do 
not take these costs into account.5 
Although moving costs may well off-
set some of the gains from migration, 
these costs would not wipe out these 
 1  The Hill, http://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/271796-
supreme-court-sets-april-date-for-immigration-case.
 2  The primary source for each brief is Howard F. Chang (ed.), 
Law and Economics of Immigration, Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 2015.  I am grateful for the assistance of Matthew 
Stengel in the preparation of these briefs.
 3  Jonathon W. Moses and Bjørn Letnes (2004), “The Eco-
nomic Costs of International Labor Restrictions: Revisiting 
the Empirical Discussion”, World Development, 32 (10), 
October, 1609-26.
 4  Michael A. Clemens (2011), “Economics and Emigration: 
Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 25 (3), Summer, 83-106.
 5  George J. Borjas (2014), Immigration Economics, Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
 6  Bob Hamilton and John Whalley (1984), “Efficiency and 
Distributional Implications of Global Restrictions on Labour 
Mobility”, Journal of Development Economics, 14 (1), 
January-February, 61-75.
 7  George J. Borjas (2014), Immigration Economics, Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
 8  Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri (2006), “The 
Economic Value of Cultural Diversity:  Evidence from U.S. 
Cities”, Journal of Economic Geography, 6 (1), January, 
9-44.
 9  Borjas (2014); George J. Borjas (1995), “The Economic Ben-
efits from Immigration”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 
(2), Spring, 3-22.
 10  Jean Baldwin Grossman (1982), “The Substitutability of Na-
tives and Immigrants in Production”, Review of Economics 
NOTES
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gains entirely. If moving costs were to 
cancel out the gains at the margin for 
a potential migrant, then that worker 
would simply choose not to move and 
thereby avoid those costs. Thus, mov-
ing costs would provide no reason to 
erect immigration barriers.
Critics also may worry that letting 
too many immigrants into a country 
would make the economy of the host 
country less productive. Empiri-
cal evidence, however, indicates that 
immigrants improve productivity by 
increasing the diversity of perspectives 
and the cross-fertilization of ideas.8 
In any event, no one seriously suggests 
that the United States simply open 
up its borders overnight without any 
restrictions. A more realistic proposal 
would be to liberalize immigration 
restrictions gradually over time so that 
the impact of immigration, includ-
ing any effects on productivity, can be 
studied and quantified. This incremen-
tal liberalization should continue until 
the expected costs of any further liber-
alization offset the expected gains. 
THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRANT 
WORKERS ON U.S. NATIVES
While the world economy as a whole 
may gain from labor migration, and 
the migrating worker may gain, does a 
country of immigration gain as well? 
Debates about immigration reform 
in the United States often focus on 
the economic welfare of native U.S. 
citizens. Accordingly, policymakers 
commonly ask whether immigration 
also produces gains for U.S. natives in 
particular.
The consensus among econo-
mists is that as a whole, natives in the 
United States gain from immigration 
in the labor market. Although wages 
may fall for some native workers who 
compete with immigrant workers in 
the labor market, this loss is merely 
a transfer among natives. Any wages 
lost by some natives are offset by the 
gains for those natives who employ 
immigrants and for those natives who 
consume goods and services at lower 
cost. The natives who gain also enjoy 
a net benefit from employing immi-
grants. George Borjas refers to this 
net gain in the economic welfare of 
natives as the “immigration surplus.”
A receiving country can increase 
its immigration surplus significantly 
by admitting more immigrants 
because an increase in the number of 
immigrants brings more than a pro-
portionate increase in the size of the 
surplus. For example, the 50 percent 
increase in the immigrant fraction of 
the U.S. workforce between 1995 and 
2014—from roughly 10 to 15 per-
cent—corresponds to a 140 percent 
increase in the immigration surplus, 
or a rise from 0.1 to 0.24 percent of 
GDP.9 Figure 1 highlights the growth 
in the immigrant population in the 
U.S., between 1970 and 2014.
Furthermore, natives can enjoy 
this immigration surplus even if 
immigration does not drive down the 
wages of natives at all. The empirical 
evidence suggests that natives and 
and Statistics, 64 (4), November, 596-603.
 11  Patricia Cortes (2008), “The Effect of Low-Skilled Immigra-
tion on U.S. Prices: Evidence from CPI Data”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 116 (3), June, 381-422; Ethan Lewis 
(2013), “Immigrant-Native Substitutability and the Role of 
Language”, in David Card and Steven Raphael (eds), Im-
migration, Poverty, and Socioeconomic Inequality, New York, 
NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 60-97.
 12  Giovanni Peri and Chad Sparber (2009), “Task Specializa-
tion, Immigration, and Wages”, American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics, 1 (3), July 135-69.
 13  George J. Borjas (1994), “The Economics of Immigration”, 
Journal of Economic Literature, XXXII (4), December, 1667-
1717; Rachel M. Friedberg and Jennifer Hunt (1995), “The 
Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment 
and Growth”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (2), 
Spring, 23-44.
 14  Joseph G. Altonji and David Card (1991), “The Effects of 
Immigration on the Labor Market Outcomes of Less-Skilled 
Natives”, and Robert J. LaLonde and Robert H. Topel (1991), 
“Labor Market Adjustments to Increased Immigration”, in 
John M. Abowd and Richard B. Freeman (eds), Immigra-
tion, Trade, and the Labor Market, Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 201-34. 
 15  David Card (1990), “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the 
Miami Labor Market”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
43 (2), January, 245-57.
 16  For a critique of the Card study, see George J. Borjas (2015), 
“The Wage Impact of the Marielitos:  A Reappraisal”, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 21588, 
NOTES 
TABLE 1: ESTIMATED GAINS TO GLOBAL OUTPUT FROM THE ELIMINATION OF 
MIGRATION RESTRICTIONS 
 
Economist(s) Data Period Result from Liberalization 
Hamilton & Whalley (1984)6  1977 13% - 197% boost to global GNP
Moses & Letnes (2004) 1998 5.6% - 118.1% boost to global GDP
Clemens (2011) Multiple Studies 50% - 150% boost to global GDP
Borjas (2014)7 2011 13.4% - 89.1% boost to global GDP
4publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
immigrants are imperfect substitutes 
in the labor market.10 Immigrant 
workers are imperfect substitutes 
for native workers in part because 
these workers differ in terms of their 
English language skills.11 Empirical 
evidence indicates that natives and 
immigrants specialize in different 
occupations in the United States based 
on the comparative advantage that 
natives enjoy from communicating in 
English.12 As long as immigrants and 
natives are imperfect substitutes in 
the labor market, the immigration of 
workers need not affect native wages 
adversely on balance. Native workers 
who would otherwise suffer adverse 
effects from competition with immi-
grants can respond to immigration by 
shifting their labor away from manual 
tasks and toward more communi-
cation-based tasks. This response 
protects them from the adverse effects 
of competition from immigrants. 
Immigration may nevertheless 
have an adverse effect on some native 
workers, the least skilled native work-
ers in particular, but the empirical 
evidence indicates these effects are 
small.13 Studies that have examined 
the effect of immigrants on particular 
subsets of native workers, includ-
ing less-skilled natives and black and 
Hispanic natives, have found modest 
or insignificant effects on native wages 
from immigration.14 The empirical lit-
erature similarly finds that the effects 
of immigration on native employment, 
unemployment, and labor force par-
ticipation are small or insignificant.
The most famous and widely-cited 
study in this literature is surely David 
Card’s evaluation of the impact of 
the sudden influx of about 125,000 
relatively unskilled Cuban immigrants 
in Miami from May to September 
in 1980.15 These Cuban immigrants, 
who fled the Fidel Castro regime via 
the port of Mariel, increased Miami’s 
labor force by a striking 7 percent 
over the span of mere months. Yet 
Card finds “essentially no effect on 
the wages or employment outcomes 
of non-Cuban workers in the Miami 
labor market.” He compares outcomes 
in Miami with trends in other cities 
from 1979 through 1985 and finds, 
even among less-skilled native blacks, 
no negative effects on native wages or 
employment.16
September.  For a study that responds to that critique and 
confirms Card’s results, see Giovanni Peri and Vasil Yasenov 
(2015), “The Labor market Effects of a Refugee Wave:  Ap-
plying the Synthetic Control Method to the Mariel Boatlift”, 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
21801, December.  For a rejoinder, see George J. Borjas 
(2016), “The Wage Impact of the Marielitos:  Additional 
Evidence”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper 21850.
 17  Alan O. Sykes (1995), “The Welfare Economics of Immi-
gration Law: A Theoretical Survey with an Analysis of U.S. 
Policy”, in Warren F. Schwartz (ed.), Justice in Immigration, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 158-200.
 18  Howard F. Chang (2009), “Immigration Restriction as Redis-
tributive Taxation: Working Women and the Costs of Protec-
tionism in the Labor Market”, Journal of Law, Economics and 
Policy, 5 (1), Spring, 1-29.
 19  Optimal tax theory suggests that redistributive taxes should 
target male workers rather than female workers so as to 
redistribute a given amount of income with the smallest 
distortion in labor supply.
 20  Patricia Cortes and Jose Tessada (2011), “Low-Skilled Im-
migration and the Labor Supply of Highly Skilled Women”, 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3 (3), July, 
88-123.
NOTES 
FIGURE 1: SIZE AND SHARE OF THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.
Source: Migration Policy Institute tabulation of data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2010 and 2014 American Com-
munity Surveys and 1970-2010 decennial Census data.
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REDISTRIBUTION AND 
IMMIGRATION’S EFFECT ON 
FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY
The adverse effect of immigration on 
the least skilled natives in the future 
could prove to be larger than it has in 
the past if the United States liberal-
izes admissions for the least skilled 
immigrants in particular. An adverse 
effect on the wages of the least skilled 
natives could worsen the distribution 
of income among natives. Neverthe-
less, concerns about the distribution 
of income among natives do not 
provide a sound economic reason to 
oppose liberalized immigration poli-
cies, even for the least skilled immi-
grants. Alan Sykes and other legal 
scholars criticize the use of quotas 
and labor certification requirements 
as inefficient, protectionist, and costly 
attempts to exclude competition in 
the labor market.17 To the extent that 
immigration has any adverse effects 
on the distribution of income among 
natives, the best response would be 
redistribution through progressive tax 
reforms rather than through restric-
tive immigration policies. The United 
States could redistribute income at 
lower cost by doing so through the tax 
system because immigration restric-
tions needlessly sacrifice the gains that 
natives derive from immigrants in the 
labor market. 
Another reason to favor redistri-
bution through the tax system over 
redistribution through immigration 
restrictions concerns the impact that 
such restrictions have on families with 
more than one worker participating in 
the labor market. In prior research, I 
have drawn upon empirical evidence 
regarding the effects of immigration 
to suggest that restrictive immigration 
policies aggravate rather than mitigate 
the distortions in work incentives that 
are associated with the redistribution 
of income.18 Specifically, I sug-
gest that the burden of protectionist 
immigration laws in the United States 
falls disproportionately on households 
with working women by driving up 
the cost of services demanded dis-
proportionately by these households, 
including child care, food preparation, 
and housekeeping. Thus, immigration 
restrictions do precisely the opposite 
of what optimal tax principles recom-
mend because they burden working 
women, whose labor supply is more 
elastic than that of men.19 Immigra-
tion restrictions introduce excessive 
distortions in labor supply by mak-
ing it more costly for the secondary 
earner, who is usually female, to work 
in the labor market. Empirical work 
by other economists confirm that low-
skilled immigration allows women in 
the United States to spend less time 
on household chores and more time 
working in the labor market.20
CONCLUSION
Economic theory raises a general pre-
sumption in favor of unrestricted labor 
mobility. Economists estimate that 
the migration of labor generates large 
gains in terms of both global eco-
nomic welfare and the economic wel-
fare of natives in countries of immi-
gration. Even partial liberalization of 
immigration restrictions yields signifi-
cant increases in economic welfare for 
immigrants and natives in receiving 
countries. Empirical evidence indi-
cates that any adverse effects on native 
wages and employment are small. In 
any event, the appropriate response to 
concerns about adverse effects on the 
distribution of income among natives 
is redistribution through the tax 
system rather than through restrictive 
immigration policies. Protectionist 
immigration laws cause needless harm 
not only by sacrificing the economic 
benefits that flow from the movement 
of people across borders but also  
by aggravating distortions in the 
incentives for women to work in the 
labor market.
Part two of this immigration policy 
series, Immigration and the Public 
Treasury (available in late May, 2016), 
will discuss the fiscal impacts of immi-
grants in the U.S.
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